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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the development of local currency sovereign bond markets (LCBMs), a 
potentially important but often overlooked source of longer-term public finance, in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). We construct a novel dataset comprising 28 SSA countries for the 
period 2000-2014 to identify the main correlates of LCBM capitalization, of local currency 
bond (LCB) tenors and of LCB issue yields. Our econometric analysis is complemented by 
case studies of Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria, where we further investigate the drivers of LCBM 
development and place LCBMs in a broader public debt context. We find that LCBMs have 
become important sources of financing in SSA but that new vulnerabilities emerge from the 
costs of domestic borrowing, short bond tenors and the composition of the investor base. 
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1. Introduction 
The public debt situation of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has undergone profound changes over 
the last decade. Thanks to vast debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) 
initiative and its successor, the Multilateral Debt relief Initiative (MDRI), many SSA 
countries were given a ‘clean slate’ (Cassimon et al., 2015; Merotto et al., 2015). Indeed, in 
the average SSA HIPC the public debt-to-GDP ratio came down from over 100% before debt 
relief to below 30% just after HIPC/MDRI completion. To address large infrastructure and 
other needs, SSA governments have accumulated new debt. Until recently, the rise in SSA 
public debt-to-GDP ratios was mostly moderate, helped by rapid growth, high commodity 
prices and large non-debt (FDI) inflows; apart from a few cases of explosive debt dynamics 
(Battaile et al., 2015). More important than the extent of renewed indebtedness, however, is 
its changing nature. Many SSA governments, including in several ex-HIPCs, now have 
access to a wider range of lenders and debt instruments than before (Prizzon and Mustapha, 
2014). In the academic and policy literature, as in the financial press, most attention has gone 
to the large US dollar-denominated bonds that SSA governments have issued in international 
markets in recent years (see for instance Mecagni et al., 2014; Adams, 2015; Gueye and Sy, 
2015; Olabisi and Stein, 2015; Sy, 2015; Gevorkyan and Kvangraven, 2016; Presbitero et al., 
2016; UNCTAD, 2016). That notwithstanding, it is important to highlight that in SSA 
marketable public debt is now increasingly issued in local currency to private domestic 
investors, a trend that follows emerging market economies in other regions, be it with a 
considerable lag (Didier and Schmukler, 2014). 
In this paper, we aim to shed light on the factors driving the development of local currency 
sovereign bond markets (LCBMs) in SSA. To this end we construct a novel dataset 
comprising 28 SSA countries for the period 2000-2014,  which allows us to identify the main 
correlates of LCBM capitalization, of local currency bond (LCB) tenors and of LCB issue 
yields by means of simple panel regressions. We complement our econometric analysis with 
brief case studies of three countries with relatively large, yet heterogeneous LCBMs, i.e., 
Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria. For these countries we investigate in more detail LCBM 
development and its drivers, and place LCBMs in a broader public debt context. 
Our paper contributes to the understanding of SSA LCBM development, first of all, by 
extending prior studies on LCBM capitalization (Mu et al., 2013; Berensmann et al., 2015; 
Essers et al., 2016) with an inquiry into the covariates of LCB tenors and issue yields, and 
second, by considering a wider range of financial development measures as explanatory 
variables. To preview our main conclusions, panel regressions indicate that democracy and 
institutional quality relate positively to LCBM capitalization, most likely because of the 
confidence they instill in investors. We further find positive correlations of LCBM 
capitalization with banking sector size, proxied by private sector credit, and a broader index 
of financial development, suggesting that LCBMs and other segments of the financial sector 
are complements rather than substitutes. Banking sector size and overall financial 
development are also positively correlated with average LCB tenors, at least in most of our 
specifications. We observe a positive link between democracy and LCB tenors, again hinting 
at the importance of government credibility, which may be particularly important for 
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investments in longer-term securities. Likewise, high inflation, found to be negatively 
correlated with average tenors, renders longer-term fixed-income investment less attractive. 
As regards borrowing costs, we find significant negative correlations of average LCB issue 
yields with economic development (i.e., GDP per capita), banking sector size and overall 
financial development, as well as with past fiscal balances, which may reflect investor 
confidence in governments’ ability to repay. As expected, the association of LCB issue yields 
with past inflation is strongly positive. By and large, these key findings are confirmed in our 
country case studies of Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines recent trends in public 
debt and LCBM development in SSA. Section 3 presents our econometric analysis of the 
correlates of LCBM capitalization, LCB tenors and LCB issue yields. In Section 4 we 
illustrate the LCBM and broader public debt dynamics of SSA countries with case studies 
from Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Public debt and local currency bond market development in SSA 
Academic and policy debates on debt dynamics in SSA have tended to focus on the external 
side of public debt. While external debt levels indeed deserve attention, not the least because 
of the associated currency risks and their central role during SSA debt crises in the past, the 
focus on external debt is too narrow. As explained in the introduction, next to major changes 
in (external) public debt levels, there have also been shifts in the composition of public debt 
in SSA. SSA public debt is increasingly owed to the private sector and, in most countries, to 
domestic investors. Both trends are epitomised by the growing reliance of governments on 
borrowing through LCBMs. This section provides a short overview of these interrelated 
trends and situates the rise of LCBMs within the broader SSA public debt landscape. 
 
2.1 Tapping private sources of financing 
Since the mid-2000s, the role of private as opposed to official creditors (like the World Bank, 
African Development Bank, IMF and bilateral donors), has increased in SSA. In particular, 
several SSA governments have issued US dollar-denominated bonds in international capital 
markets since 2006. Excluding South Africa, which issued international bonds regularly even 
before 2006 and has continued to do so thereafter, no less than 16 SSA sovereigns have 
tapped international bond markets so far, most of them for the first time ever.1 According to 
figures obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream, taken together these countries raised 
about US$ 29 billion through 35 international issuances between September 2006 and 
September 2016. Initially, issuance was spurred by lower debt burdens and rapid growth in 
many SSA countries, combined with low global interest rates and high commodity prices (Sy, 
2015; Presbitero et al., 2016), factors which have become much less favourable as of recent. 
                                                           
1
 These countries are Angola, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, 
Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania and Zambia. 
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In addition, SSA governments have begun to raise private financing in local currency from 
domestic capital markets. As Figure 1 shows, most SSA LCBMs have grown relative to GDP 
since 2000, with renewed momentum from 2009 onwards. Evaluated over 2000-2014 the 
largest LCBMs in SSA could be found in South Africa (31% of GDP on average), followed 
by island states Mauritius (20%) and Cabo Verde (16%), Kenya (11%), Ghana (10%) and 
Namibia (10%). The (unweighted) average LCBM capitalization  in the 28 countries for 
which we could collect such data amounted to 8.3% of GDP in 2014, up from about 5.5% in 
2008 (see Section 3.2 for more details on our dataset). 
While domestic commercial banks continue to be the dominant investors in LCBs in most 
SSA countries (Essers et al., 2016), several governments have made strides in attracting other 
domestic private investors too, especially non-bank institutional investors such as local 
pension and insurance funds, as well as foreign private investors. In Nigeria, for instance, 
foreign investors’ share in the primary market for sovereign LCBs increased considerably, 
from less than 1% in 2011 to 10.5% in 2012, due to the inclusion of these bonds in 
international benchmark indices (African Financial Markets Initiative, 2016d).2  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Of course, to a large extent, SSA’s greater reliance on private investors reflects changes in 
donor policies, most notably large debt relief initiatives (cf. Introduction) and a general shift 
from loans to grants by donor institutions in the wake of debt relief (Cassimon et al., 2015), 
both reducing publicly held debt. But that is only part of the story. Several SSA countries 
have made deliberate efforts to scale up private borrowing so as to reduce their reliance on 
donors, and the influence these have on domestic policy through the conditionality attached 
to their support. For example, Cassimon et al. (2016) find that international bond issuance in 
Rwanda may have been motivated, in part, by the desire of Rwandan authorities to reduce 
interference of international donors in domestic policy. In addition, reliance on private 
sources of government borrowing has increased in response to pressures from the IMF and 
others to reduce central bank lending to the government, in an attempt to increase central 
bank independence and fight inflation (Brownbridge et al., 1998; Jácome et al., 2012). 
 
2.2 Domestic borrowing 
The efforts of SSA authorities in promoting LCBM development also reflect a broader trend 
of debt ‘domestication’, in line with the experiences of emerging market economies in other 
regions (Didier and Schmukler, 2014). Domestic debt comprises a large and growing share of 
total public debt in many SSA countries (UNCTAD, 2016). For a sample of 31 SSA 
countries, Bataille et al. (2015) find that domestic debt constituted on average about one third 
                                                           
2
 See section 4.3 on Nigeria’s LCBM. 
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of total public debt in 2013. In 11 of these 31 countries, obligations to domestic creditors 
amounted to 40% or more of public debt (see Figure 2).3 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
While domestic public borrowing can take various forms, domestic capital markets are 
generally considered the cornerstone. Historically, however, SSA countries, much like 
developing countries in general, faced significant challenges in borrowing in local currency at 
longer maturities (and at reasonable cost), a phenomenon known as original sin (Eichengreen 
and Hausmann, 1999). Even now, developing countries with access to international capital 
markets tend to face difficult trade-offs. International borrowing in foreign currency tends to 
be cheaper, in nominal terms, than borrowing in local currency in domestic markets. In the 
latter case investors require additional compensation for currency risks, higher (expected) 
inflation, and risks related to changing local taxation/regulation and financial market 
frictions, including illiquidity (Du and Schreger, 2016). Conversely, for the debtor 
government foreign currency borrowing comes with substantial exchange rate risks. 
Moreover, substituting external, foreign currency debt with domestic, local currency debt 
may increase rollover and interest rate risks because of the typically shorter maturities of the 
latter; this implies it will have to be refinanced more frequently and possibly at a higher rate 
(Blommestein and Horman, 2007; Panizza, 2010). For instance, between 2007 and 2014 
Ghana issued three Eurobonds with tenors between 10 and 12 years, whereas the average 
tenor of its LCBs at issuance was about two years only (Olabisi and Stein, 2015; African 
Financial Markets Initiative, 2016a). With the deepening of LCBMs, however, maturities of 
domestic public debt are slowly lengthening, even though the costs of domestic borrowing 
remain relatively high for most SSA countries. Again in Ghana, average LCB issue yields 
stood at no less than 23% in 2014. 
Why then, given the comparatively high costs and rollover risks of domestic borrowing, have 
governments of SSA countries increased their reliance on domestic creditors? The literature 
suggests at least three factors underlying the trend towards domestic debt in general and 
borrowing from LCBMs in particular. First, tightening external financing conditions during 
the global financial crisis might have played a role, as the increase in borrowing from 
domestic financial markets following the global financial crisis suggests (Battaile et al., 
2015). Second, both policymakers across SSA and international financial institutions 
increasingly see the development of domestic capital markets, notably LCBMs, as a key 
strategy to mitigate currency mismatches arising from external borrowing while meeting 
significant longer-term financing needs (IMF et al., 2013; Berensmann et al., 2015; Cassimon 
et al., 2016). Third, international financial institutions have actively promoted the 
development of LCBMs, aimed at enhancing both domestic and international financial 
stability (Rethel, 2010; IMF et al., 2013).  
                                                           
3
 In some of the countries in Figure 2 where the share of domestic public debt has come down between 2007 and 
2014, such as Ghana and Zambia, this was due to the issuance of several large, US dollar-denominated 
international bonds. 
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Overall, however, the causes and consequences of the shift towards domestic borrowing in 
SSA (and developing countries more generally) have been under-researched. The limited 
attention in the academic and policy literature has two main reasons. First, until recently, the 
availability of good-quality data on domestic debt in SSA was very limited. Second, the 
vulnerabilities associated with foreign currency denominated debt are often seen as more 
significant because central banks in developing countries cannot print the hard currency 
necessary to repay such debt. 
This is not to say that the growing importance of LCBMs has not been recognized. Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009), who analyse 800 years of financial crises around the world, emphasise the 
need for research on the dynamics of domestic public debt. Likewise, Panizza (2010),who 
examines the increasing reliance on domestic, local currency-denominated debt in developing 
countries, highlights the need for better monitoring domestic debt to address emerging 
vulnerabilities. Rethel (2012) makes a plea to pay greater attention to the political and 
normative implications of the shift towards domestic debt in emerging economies. Bua et al. 
(2014) zoom in on the characteristics of domestic public debt in low-income countries in 
particular, including several African countries in their analysis. And Ncube and Brixiová 
(2015) examine the post-debt-relief sustainability of public debt in SSA. The studies closest 
related to the current paper are Mu et al. (2013), Berensmann et al. (2015) and Essers et al. 
(2016), who investigate the determinants of LCBM capitalization in SSA econometrically. 
Still, much of the existing literature on public debt in SSA tends to focus on external 
borrowing, and the economic vulnerabilities it may create. The few studies devoted to 
sovereign borrowing in domestic financial markets in SSA provide no systematic analysis of 
LCBMs. Indeed, characteristics of SSA LCBMs such as average maturities, bond yields and 
investor classes, and their implications for the borrowing governments are hardly addressed. 
Our econometric analysis and country case studies seek to fill this gap. 
 
3. Regression analysis of local currency bond market capitalization, bond tenors and 
issue yields 
3.1 Model specification 
To look deeper into the correlates of LCBM development in SSA we estimate three series of 
reduced-form panel data models: 
TBGDPit = α1 + β1Xi,t-1 + δ1FINDEV i,t-1  + γ1µi + φ1πt + ε1it      (1) 
TBTENit = α2 + β2Xi,t-1 + δ2FINDEV i,t-1  + γ2µi + φ2πt + ε2it      (2) 
TBYLDit = α3 + β3Xi,t-1 + δ3FINDEV i,t-1  + γ3µi + φ3πt + ε3it,     (3) 
where TBGDPit, TBTENit and TBYLDit are different proxies of LCBM development and our 
dependent variables of interest: LCBM capitalization as a percentage of GDP, average tenors 
of LCBs, and average issue yields of LCBs, respectively; Xi,t-1 is a vector of one-year lagged 
explanatory variables derived from the literature and further described below; FINDEV
 i,t-1 is 
a measure of financial development, for which we use various alternatives; µi are country-
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specific effects; πt is a global factor common to all countries; and ε1it, ε2it, ε3it are the error 
terms. 
We estimate equations (1), (2) and (3) independently from each other using either simple 
pooled ordinary least squares (POLS, where γ1, γ2 or γ3 are assumed to be zero) or the fixed 
effects (FE) estimator. Whereas the FE estimator will suffer less from omitted variable bias 
(by controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between countries), the POLS 
estimator captures both within- and between-country variation; the latter being the dominant 
source of variation in all three dependent and most independent variables. Because of the 
small sample sizes of our panels and short, unbalanced time dimensions we do not attempt to 
correct for potential non-stationarity or other dynamics of and between our variables. Also, 
other than by taking one-year lags, we do not address possible reverse causality or other 
endogeneity problems, due to the difficulty of finding good instruments. Our results should 
hence not be interpreted as demonstrating causality, a caveat that also applies to the relevant 
studies on LCBM development in SSA (Mu et al., 2013; Berensmann et al., 2015; Essers et 
al., 2016) and in other regions (Burger and Warnock, 2006; Claessens et al., 2007; 
Eichengreen et al., 2008; Bhattacharyay, 2013). Nonetheless, we believe the econometric 
analysis that follows contributes to our understanding of SSA LCBMs by extending prior 
studies with an inquiry into the covariates of LCB tenors and issue yields and by considering 
a wider range of financial development measures as regressors. 
 
3.2 Data description 
Our three dependent variables are constructed from the African Financial Markets Initiative  
(AFMI)’s (2016) African Financial Markets Database (AFMD), for which data is collected 
through a network of liaison officers from African central banks and finance ministries, 
complemented with information from debt management offices, stock exchanges, regulators 
and other agencies (African Financial Markets Initiative, 2016a). LCB data in the AFMD is 
typically based on auction results and official reports. Security-level information is validated, 
cross-checked and harmonised between countries by the African Development Bank’s 
statistics department and an AFMI team before being aggregated into yearly country-level 
data. We focus here on local currency Treasury bonds with an original maturity of one year 
or longer, all of which have been issued in the domestic market. ‘LCBM capitalization’ is 
defined as the total amount of year-end outstanding LCBs as a percentage of GDP; ‘average 
tenor of LCBs’ is the average tenor of year-end outstanding LCBs expressed in years, 
weighted by the size of each individual bond; and ‘average issue yield of LCBs’ is the 
weighted average yield at issuance of all LCBs issued over the year expressed in annual 
percentages.4 
Currently the AFMD has information on the LCBM capitalization and average bond tenors of 
28 SSA countries over a maximum period of 15 years, 2000-2014, although with uneven 
coverage. Due to missing values we have 282 and 261 observations in our capitalization and 
                                                           
4
 Ideally we would have studied the yields of outstanding LCBs as quoted on secondary markets. LCBMs are 
however highly illiquid in most SSA countries and secondary market quotes are not readily available. 
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bond tenor samples, respectively. The AFMD sample of average issue yields is limited to an 
unbalanced panel of 14 SSA countries over 2000-2014, good for 128 observations in total. 
Table A1 in Appendix provides details on the country-year sample for each of the three 
dependent variables. Table A2 presents the descriptive statistics of these variables. Between-
country variation  is clearly larger than within-country variation. 
For our independent variables in vector Xi,t-1 we start with a selection of regressors that 
appear in the prior work of Mu et al. (2013), Berensmann et al. (2015) and Essers et al. 
(2016) on LCBM capitalization: log GDP and log GDP per capita; the three-year moving 
average of the fiscal balance to GDP; log inflation; the Chinn-Ito index of capital account 
openness; a dummy for British legal origins; and composite measures of democracy (from the 
Polity IV database) and institutional quality (from the World Governance Indicators).5 
Because of the likely importance of broader financial sector development for LCBMs we 
experiment with various measures. First, we consider private sector credit by banks (and 
other financial institutions) to GDP, an oft-used proxy of domestic banking sector size that 
also features in Mu et al. (2013), Berensmann et al. (2015) and Essers et al. (2016). Local 
banks often serve as primary dealers and market makers in SSA LCBMs and, in most 
countries, are also important LCB investors. Second, we make use of a novel composite 
index of financial development recently developed by IMF staff, which captures dimensions 
of depth, access and efficiency of both financial institutions and financial markets.6 In 
alternative specifications we look at associations of LCBM development with banking sector 
concentration, operationalized as the asset share of the largest three banks, and the presence 
of foreign-owned banks in the economy (as a share of the total number of banks). The 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index or VIX, a forward-looking 
measure of global financial market uncertainty, is taken as our baseline common global 
factor. Table A2 in Appendix shows the descriptive statistics of the just-described 
explanatory variables. Again, between-country variation trumps within-country variation in 
most variables, with the exception of inflation and fiscal balances. 
Figures A1, A2 and A3 in Appendix bring together a series of graphs where each of the three 
dependent variables is plotted against individual explanatory variables. These scatter plots 
suggest LCBM capitalization is positively associated with log GDP, log GDP per capita, 
democracy, institutional quality, private sector credit and overall financial development, and 
negatively with fiscal balances, log inflation, bank concentration and the share of foreign 
banks (Figure A1). Most of these associations remain visible when South Africa and 
Mauritius, which have the most-capitalized LCBMs in relative terms, are excluded from the 
sample. Similarly, we observe positive relations between average LCB tenors on the one 
hand, and log GDP per capita, democracy, institutional quality and financial development on 
the other hand (Figure A2). Only log inflation exhibits a strong negative correlation with 
average LCB tenors. Excluding outlier South Africa does not seem to alter these relations. 
                                                           
5
 See Mu et al. (2013), Berensmann et al. (2015) and Essers et al. (2016) for the rationale behind including each 
of these variables. 
6
 See Svirydzenka (2016) for more details on the underlying indicators and construction of the index. 
Importantly, the index does not include direct measures of domestic government debt, making it complementary 
to our dependent variables. 
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Average LCB yields generally increase with GDP, inflation and foreign bank shares, and 
decrease with GDP per capita, democracy, institutional quality, financial development and 
bank concentration, also when high-bond-yield countries Ghana and Mozambique are 
discarded  (Figure A3). 
Finally, the scatter plots in Figure A4 in Appendix show the interrelations between our three 
dependent variables. Higher LCBM capitalization, longer LCB tenors and lower issue yields 
seems to go hand in hand in SSA, even when outliers in these dimensions are excluded. This 
corresponds well with Bua et al. (2014), who find that in a sample of low-income countries 
domestic debt portfolios of longer maturity bear lower costs, especially in countries with 
higher financial development. 
 
3.3 Baseline results and discussion 
Table 1 presents the estimation results for different variations on Equation (1). The POLS 
estimates show that better past fiscal balances are negatively correlated with LCBM 
capitalization, mimicking the results of Berensmann et al. (2015) and Essers et al. (2016). 
Most likely, smaller borrowing needs translate into lower volumes of outstanding LCBs. Also 
in line with prior studies, democracy and institutional quality relate positively to LCBM 
capitalization, although not very significantly. Taken at face value, this seems to imply 
LCBMs can better thrive when government policy is credible and when a good institutional 
framework is in place. LCBM capitalization is also higher in larger, more developed SSA 
economies with a more open capital account. These relations do not seem particularly robust, 
however. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
We observe highly significant positive correlations with banking sector size (as proxied by 
private sector credit) and broader financial development, suggesting LCBMs and other 
segments of the financial sector are typically complements rather than substitutes in SSA. In 
addition, banking sector concentration (as measured by the asset share of the three largest 
banks) correlates negatively with LCBM capitalization, as does the presence of foreign-
owned banks. An explanation may be that in a concentrated, oligopolistic banking sector the 
few large banks that exist may enjoy high returns, which would give them little incentive to 
help the government in financing itself through the capital market. Foreign banks may have 
more outside investment options than domestic banks and may be less easily persuaded by 
the government to buy its LCBs. 
As expected, it is much harder to find significant results in the FE estimates, which focus 
exclusively on the limited within-country variation in our sample.7 That said, we still find a 
significantly positive association between institutional quality and LCBM capitalization. 
                                                           
7
 Hausman-type overidentification tests strongly reject the null of country effects being uncorrelated with the 
specifications’ regressors, indicating a preference for the FE estimator over the random effects (RE) estimator 
from a consistency perspective. 
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Moreover, the coefficients of the different financial sector variables have the same sign and 
are of a similar magnitude as when estimated by POLS. The VIX has a negative coefficient 
which borders on significance, suggesting that global market uncertainty may hamper LCBM 
capitalization. 
Table 2 gives the estimation results for Equation (2). When estimated using POLS, the 
strongest results are observed for banking sector and broader financial development, both of 
which are positively correlated with average LCB tenors. This seems to be in line with our 
findings from Table 1. Also the democracy coefficient is again positive and significant. 
Government credibility may be especially important to ease the minds of investors in longer-
term securities. Likewise, high inflation renders longer-term fixed-income investment less 
attractive. Maybe somewhat surprisingly, a higher VIX is seemingly associated with longer 
average LCB tenors. One explanation is that in times of greater global market uncertainty 
long-term external finance is harder to come by for SSA sovereigns and a relative increase in 
longer-tenor LCBs needs to make up for that. An alternative explanation is that international 
investors are more willing to take risks in ’frontier markets’ when risks rise globally, leading 
to greater international appetite for longer-tenor LCBs in SSA. Such speculative hypotheses 
require further research, however. In column (7) of Table 2 we replace our financial 
development measures with LCBM capitalization. The association with LCB tenors is 
positive (cf. Figure A.4 in Appendix) but not significant in the presence of our other 
regressors. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Turning to the FE regressions for LCB tenors we find very few significant results, apart from 
the seemingly counterintuitive positive correlation with VIX and a correlation with economic 
size. Another, notable exception is the highly significant negative association between LCBM 
capitalization and average tenors. This suggests that within one and the same country an 
increase in the outstanding volume of LCBs may come at the expense of maturity 
lengthening. 
Lastly, Table 3 contains the POLS and FE estimation results for Equation (3). In line with 
expectations the former display significant negative correlations of average LCB issue yields 
with log GDP per capita, banking sector size and overall financial development, and a very 
strong positive correlation with log inflation. The negative association with fiscal balances 
may be due to more sustainable government finances instilling greater investor confidence. 
The negative correlation with bank concentration may be the result of a close relation or even 
collusion between governments and a few dominant banks in some SSA countries. Moreover, 
when the banking sector is less concentrated and more competitive, banks may be more 
engaged in corporate financing, which then provides an alternative to investing in 
government bonds; lower demand for the latter pushes up yields.The positive coefficient for 
institutional quality seems counterintuitive. A higher share of foreign banks is associated with 
higher yields, as foreign banks may need to be compensated more to invest in local currency 
assets than local banks (which are often naturally hedged because of their local currency 
liabilities). This sits well with our interpretation of the results in Table 1. Longer LCB tenors 
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again seem to go hand in hand with lower yields ( see Figure A4 in Appendix and Bua et al., 
2014). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Unlike in Tables 2 and 3, the FE results in Table 1 are largely in line with those of the POLS 
estimations. Most visibly, within-country increases in banking sector size, financial 
development and bank concentration are related with decreasing average LCB yields, while 
increases in inflation and foreign bank shares go together with rising yields. 
 
3.4 Robustness8 
We test the robustness of our baseline results in several ways, including by augmenting the 
POLS and FE specifications in Tables 1, 2 and 3 with other variables that may matter for 
LCBM capitalization, LCB tenors and/or LCB issue yields. 
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 we re-estimate the baseline specifications of columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 1 without South Africa and Mauritius, the two countries with the most-
capitalized LCBMs. As in Table 1, we find clear positive correlations of LCBM 
capitalization with private sector credit and broader financial development, and a negative 
association with the fiscal balance (in POLS regressions). The positive links with democracy 
and institutional quality are again most visible in POLS and FE regressions, respectively. 
Next, in column (3) of Table 4 we replace the overall financial development index with its 
sub-indices for financial institutions and financial markets. Whereas the coefficients of both 
sub-indices are positive, those of the former are statistically more significant, indicating once 
more the importance of banks for LCBMs.9 Inflation volatility, calculated as the yearly 
standard deviation of monthly inflation rates, seems to hamper LCBM capitalization (column 
(4)), as expected. Real exchange rate volatility, i.e., the yearly standard deviation of first 
differences in log monthly real exchange rates (a proxy of unanticipated deviations from a 
constant trend), also has a significant negative coefficient, but only when estimated using 
POLS (column (5)). Inclusion of those extra variables does not alter the conclusions of our 
baseline models. In unreported regressions we experimented with substituting the baseline 
VIX by other common factors, such as international commodity price indices, global liquidity 
(proxied by international bank claims or total credit in US dollar, euro and yen; see BIS, 
2016) or the US Effective Federal Funds rate. Very similar results as in the baseline 
regressions were obtained. Replacing the VIX with year dummies has little effect on the 
POLS estimations but renders the coefficient of the financial development index insignificant 
in the FE model, most probably by removing even more of the already limited variation 
                                                           
8
 To save space, we do not report all robustness results discussed in this section. All unreported results are, 
however, available upon request. 
9
 The financial institutions sub-index is dominated by variables measuring the depth, access to, and efficiency of 
countries’ banking sector. The financial markets sub-index covers stock market variables as well as the 
international issuance of debt securities by governments and total debt issuance by corporations (see 
Svirydzenka, 2016). 
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(column (6)). In column (7) we test the substitutability between LCBs and different forms of 
external public debt, i.e., outstanding loans from official (multilateral and bilateral) creditors, 
outstanding international bonds, and outstanding loans from non-resident commercial banks 
and other private creditors (all expressed as percentages of GDP and constructed from the 
World Bank’s International Debt Statistics). Interestingly, the only significant substitution we 
find, at least in the POLS regression, is between (domestic) LCBs and internationally issued 
foreign currency bonds. Net official development aid (ODA) disbursements have a weak 
positive correlation with LCBM capitalization (results not shown). Adding dummies for the 
years following countries’ graduation from the HIPC initiative and Nigeria’s large Paris Club 
deal in 2005 indicates there is no direct link between debt relief and LCBM development, in 
line with the results of Essers et al. (2016).10 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 5 collects the robustness results for our average LCB tenor regressions. In columns (1) 
and (2) (which mirror columns (3) and (4) of Table 2) we exclude outlier South Africa from 
our baseline sample. As before, democracy is significantly associated with longer average 
tenors, while the association with inflation is negative, at least in the POLS regressions. 
Banking sector and broader financial development remain positively related with tenors in the 
POLS models but their coefficients lose statistical significance. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
negative associations between our financial development measures and average tenors in the 
baseline FE models become statistically significant once South Africa is dropped. A possible 
(but maybe not entirely satisfactory) explanation are crowding out effects, i.e., when banks 
increase their lending to the private sector they may cut back on their longer-term lending to 
the government (more so than on their shorter-term lending). But this would only explain the 
negative within-country association between average tenors and private sector credit, not 
between tenors and broader financial development. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
We again observe positive associations with the VIX (in the POLS and FE models) and with 
the size of the economy (in the FE models). A split of overall financial development into 
separate indices for financial institutions and markets in column (3) of Table 5 points to the 
particular relevance of the former in the POLS regression, similarly as in Table 4. Inflation 
volatility is linked negatively to average LCB tenors, as it creates uncertainty for longer-term 
investment in fixed-income assets (column (4)). We find a positive link between exchange 
                                                           
10
 Of the 27 countries included in our baseline regressions no less than 17 received debt relief under the HIPC 
initiative and subsequent MDRI. All but one (Chad) reached their HIPC completion point during the sample 
period: Uganda (2000), Mozambique (2001), Tanzania (2001), Burkina Faso (2002), Benin (2003), Mali (2003), 
Ghana (2004), Niger (2004), Senegal (2004), Rwanda (2005), Cameroon (2006), Malawi (2006), The Gambia 
(2007), Burundi (2009), Togo (2010) and Cote d’Ivoire (2012). Ideally, we would use present value measures of 
HIPC and other debt relief, rather than dummies, to account for the concessionality of the original debt being 
forgiven/restructured (and for the concessionality of the debt relief operation itself). Present value estimates of 
debt relief have been constructed by Depetris Chauvin and Kraay (2005) but, to our knowledge, have not been 
updated beyond 2003. 
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rate volatility and LCB tenors in the POLS variant of the model (column (5)), which is 
probably spurious; flexible exchange rates coexist with relatively long LCB tenors in 
countries such as South Africa and Namibia, without there being a clear causal relation. 
Experimentation with global variables other than the VIX leaves the baseline results 
qualitatively unchanged (results not shown). Introducing year dummies again has only a 
limited effect on the POLS estimations (column (6)). In column (7) we use insurance 
company assets scaled to GDP instead of the broad financial development index, as a proxy 
for the size of the domestic non-bank institutional investor base. While this reduces our 
sample considerably, we do find a highly significant positive correlation between the size of a 
country’s insurance sector and average LCB tenors in the POLS estimation, even when 
excluding outlier South Africa.11 We cannot confirm this positive association in the FE 
model, however, which may be due to the very limited within-country variation in insurance 
fund assets.  
Finally, we also subject our baseline estimates for the correlates of average LCB issue yields 
to a set of robustness tests. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show that excluding high-yield 
Ghana and Mozambique from our sample leaves intact most of the conclusions we drew from 
Table 3: average issue yields are correlated positively with inflation, GDP and institutional 
quality, and negatively with GDP per capita, private sector credit and overall financial 
development (although the coefficient of that last variable is no longer statistically 
significant). In addition, both in the POLS and FE models the democracy coefficient turns 
negative and statistically significant. In line with the robustness results in Tables 4 and 5, 
column (3) of Table 6 suggests the financial institutions dimension of overall financial 
development matters most for LCBM development (here: lower issue yields). Inflation and 
exchange rate volatility are positively linked to LCB issue yields, the former significantly so 
(columns (4) and (5)). Adding these variables to the model does not influence the other 
estimated coefficients much; neither does the replacement of the VIX with commodity price 
indices, global liquidity or the Fed Funds rate (results not shown). The inclusion of year 
dummies in column (6) has little effect on the POLS regression but makes that the financial 
development coefficient is very imprecisely estimated and hence no longer significant in the 
FE model. Lastly, we find a highly significant positive association between the average LCB 
issue yield and the central bank’s policy rate, the key reference rate in the domestic economy 
(column (7)).12 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
4. Country case studies 
What new possibilities does the deepening of LCBMs open up in SSA and what new 
constraints does it impose? On the one hand, vulnerability to external financial and economic 
shocks is likely to decline if the deepening of LCBMs reduces currency mismatches and the 
                                                           
11
 Due to data gaps for our sample, it was not feasible to include pension fund assets in the estimations. 
12
 We estimate the model in column (7) without log inflation because of its strong collinearity with the policy 
rate. When both variables are included the inflation coefficient loses its significance.  
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dependence on external finance more generally. It should be noted, however, that LCBMs 
may still be a transmitter of international financial contagion if a high share of LCBs is held 
by international investors. Furthermore, a greater reliance on domestic capital is likely to 
reduce governments’ exposure to the demands of international donors and financial 
institutions. On the other hand, new vulnerabilities may emerge if LCBM development is 
associated with a high concentration of local sovereign bond holdings in the domestic 
banking sector. In most SSA countries, commercial banks are the dominant holders of 
sovereign bonds and, as a result, a deepening of LCBMs usually goes hand in hand with 
increasing interdependence between the state and commercial banks. When there is a greater 
risk of a sovereign debt crisis, the likelihood of a domestic banking crisis increases and vice 
versa, a phenomenon often referred to as the sovereign-bank ‘doom loop’ (e.g., Farhi and 
Tirole, 2016). To address this problem, a broadening of the investor base is crucial. 
The remainder of this section will illustrate these points with brief case studies from Ghana, 
Kenya and Nigeria. They have been selected from our SSA sample as countries with a LCBM 
that has become large enough to affect the wider economy and the governments’ policy 
space. Moreover, these three countries vary across different dimensions, most importantly 
their reliance on external financing and the composition of the investor base of domestic debt. 
 
4.1 Ghana 
The composition of Ghana’s public debt has changed markedly since the 2000s. In 2005, 
external debt constituted a major component of Ghana’s public debt, amounting to 76% of 
the total (MOFEP, 2010). In 2014, external debt constituted still the majority of total debt but 
the domestic debt share amounted to 44% (MOFEP, 2016). The rise in the share of domestic 
debt reflects two developments. First, external debt declined significantly in 2006 in absolute 
terms, notably because of Ghana’s participation in multilateral debt relief. While Ghana 
issued large Eurobonds in 2007, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016, the proportion of external debt 
has only increased gradually since debt relief. Second, domestic borrowing has increased 
significantly from the second half of the 2000s onwards (UNCTAD, 2016). Especially in 
recent years, Ghana’s government has faced large gross financing needs induced by 
weakening economic performance and compounded by the sharp drop in oil and other 
commodity prices and by power shortages.  
Before the mid-2000s, the government’s domestic borrowing in local currency was mainly 
short-term, especially through Treasury bills. However, from the late 2000s onwards, the 
government was able to lengthen maturities and to rely more on LCBs (African Financial 
Markets Initiative, 2016b; UNCTAD, 2016). At end-2012, Treasury bonds with a maturity of 
one year or more represented 62% of the total domestic debt stock (African Financial 
Markets Initiative, 2016b). LCBM capitalization amounted on average to 11% of GDP 
between 2005 and 2014. While Ghana’s weakly developed banking sector was not conducive 
to bond market development, Ghana had high rates of economic growth over the past decade, 
averaging 9% between 2008 and 2013. Moreover, Ghana scores high with respect to 
institutional quality, epitomised by relatively efficient public institutions and political 
SOAS Department of Economics Working Paper No 202 – 2017 
 
17 
 
stability, which our empirical analysis confirms to be one of the key correlates of LCBM 
development. 
That said, Ghana’s government has had problems in lengthening maturities. The average 
tenor of its LCBs at issuance was only about two years between 2007 and 2014. Half of the 
outstanding treasury bonds (52%) had a maturity of three years. Only in 2013, the Ghanaian 
government was able to issue its first seven-year LCB, followed by a 10-year LCB in 
November 2016, the longest tenor issued so far. 
Another challenge is the cost of domestic borrowing. The government has been increasingly 
able to meet its financing needs through the issuance of LCBs, even though fiscal deficits 
rose in recent years. To compensate for a greater perceived risk of fiscal unsustainability, 
however, investors have demanded greater returns on their LCBs. Between 2005 and 2014, 
average issue yields in Ghana have been around six percentage points higher than in Nigeria 
and Kenya, for instance, even though average maturities have been considerably shorter 
(African Financial Markets Initiative, 2016a). 
Vulnerabilities in Ghana not only emerge from the costs of domestic borrowing and 
associated rollover risks but also from the fact that LCBs are mainly held by Ghana’s 
commercial banks. If the Ghanaian government encounters problems in servicing its debt, the 
stability of the banking sector will also be affected. Greater interdependencies might also 
have another negative effect, namely weaker enforcement of prudential banking regulation. 
In the past, Ghana’s government was hesitant to employ disciplinary measures against 
Ghanaian banks which experienced financial distress because they held a high portion of 
government paper (IMF, 2003). Incentives for regulatory forbearance are likely to increase as 
the government seeks to expand its medium and long-term borrowing from LCBMs. 
That said, Ghana’s reliance on LCBMs may also enhance the country’s policy space, in at 
least two ways. First, the combined effect of a still largely domestic investor base and the 
interdependence between the government and banking sector may lower the risk that 
investors exit the market when the government’s default risk rises in response to economic 
shocks (Hardie, 2011). Reliance on local capital may thus reduce the vulnerability to the 
vagaries of financial markets because local capital tends to be more concerned about the 
longer-term performance and thus more patient than foreign capital. Second, Ghana might be 
able to enhance its policy autonomy vis-à-vis international donors by further reducing aid 
dependence. The IMF’s seal of approval of Ghana’s economic policies is likely to remain 
important to enhance investor confidence. Yet significant demand for Ghanaian sovereign 
bonds, both in local and foreign currencies as evident in oversubscriptions of bonds, enhances 
the government’s bargaining power vis-à-vis donors and international financial institutions 
(Dontoh and Wallace, 2016). 
 
4.2 Kenya 
Kenya’s LCBM is much more developed than Ghana’s, both with respect to size and 
maturity. Between 2005 and 2014 local currency Treasury bonds outstanding amounted on 
average to 13% of GDP in Kenya (African Financial Markets Initiative, 2016a). For 
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comparison, in our 28-country sample only Cabo Verde, Mauritius and South Africa had a 
higher average LCBM capitalization during the same period, highlighting the great strides 
that Kenyan authorities have made. The Kenyan government has also been successful in 
lengthening the tenors of the LCBs it issues. While the ratio of Treasury bills to bonds stood 
at 73 to 27 in 2001 it stood at 26 to 74 in 2014 (African Financial Markets Initiative, 2014). 
In 2008, the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) issued the first LCB with 20-year maturity. This 
was followed by successful issuance of a 25-year LCB in 2010 and a 30-year ’savings 
development bond’” to promote private saving in 2011 (Ndung’u, 2011: 1). In 2015, LCBs 
accounted for 73% of all domestic debt (Republic of Kenya, 2015: 8). The average tenor of 
outstanding LCBs was about 10 years between 2005 and 2014. 
In addition, Kenya has a more diversified investor base for LCBs than most other SSA 
countries. While non-resident investors play a negligible role in domestic debt markets, 
holding only about 1% of domestic debt in 2014, resident investors cover a variety of sectors. 
Commercial banks hold about 48% of LCBs, the insurance sector holds 11%, and 38% is 
held by other investors, notably pension funds, which are required to invest up to 70% of 
their assets in government securities (African Financial Markets Initiative, 2016c). Kenyan 
authorities have also sought to increase participation from the domestic retail sector through 
several measures. For instance, in 2009 the CBK reduced the minimum amounts required for 
investments in Treasury bills and bonds from KES 1 million to KES 100,000 and KES 
50,000, respectively (UNCTAD, 2016: 74). In addition, the government has sought to 
encourage retail participation, by means of education initiatives and the development of an 
mobile phone application, Treasury Mobile Direct, to facilitate mobile phone-based 
investments and ease redemption of maturing debt.13 
What explains Kenya’s relative success in LCBM development? It is probably of no small 
importance that Kenya’s economy has several features which our analysis has identified as 
key factors associated with a greater capitalization of LCBMs. Specifically, Kenya has a 
comparatively well-developed banking sector, which is comprised mostly of privately owned 
domestic banks. Moreover, its banking sector is among the most competitive in SSA, with the 
assets of the three major banks averaging around 44% of total commercial banking assets 
between 2005 and 2014. Equally important for the development of Kenya’s LCBMs was 
political initiative. Kenya’s government had a thorny relationship with bilateral donors, the 
World Bank and the IMF throughout the 1990s because these external actors withheld 
financial assistance out of concerns about the quality of governance, especially in relation to 
corruption, despite the slow but steady progress the Kenyan government made in improving 
macroeconomic stability (Grosh and Orvis, 1996; Throup and Hornsby, 1998; IMF, 2008). 
Finding the route to official borrowing relatively closed and lacking access to financing from 
international capital markets due to Kenya’s perceived high risk of default, Kenya’s 
government began to rely heavily on domestic rather than external borrowing from the late 
1990s onwards. 
                                                           
13
 However, the launch of Kenya’s maiden KES 5 billion mobile-phone-only bond, the so-called M-Akiba bond, 
originally planned for October 2015, has been postponed several times, mainly due to high and volatile interest 
rates. 
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To facilitate domestic borrowing and improve the sustainability of public debt, the 
government stepped up efforts to develop LCBMs, as epitomised by the Market Leaders 
Forum. The government established this forum in 2001 for consultation and exchange among 
LCBM participants, notably the CBK, commercial banks, fund managers, the National 
Treasury, diaspora representatives, insurance companies and investment banks (Ndung’u, 
2011; African Financial Markets Initiative, 2016c). The forum’s initial objective was to 
lengthen the tenors of LCBs. Yet over the years it has also served to discuss other LCBM 
goals of the government such as the development of the secondary market and a 
diversification of the investor base. 
While Kenya’s LCBM is relatively dynamic, the government has limited some of the 
vulnerabilities that may arise from borrowing from LCBMs. In particular, the Kenyan 
government has developed a strong revenue base with the ratio of taxes to GDP averaging 
around 15% between 2010 and 2012, which is significantly higher than the average for SSA 
(World Bank, 2016). Kenya has also reduced rollover risks by lengthening maturity profiles. 
In addition, yields are significantly lower than in Ghana, enhancing the sustainability of 
Kenya’s debt. While it is difficult to pin down the exact reasons for lower issue yields, it is 
again notable that Kenya possesses several of the features which our analysis identified as 
important correlates of lower borrowing costs, including a reasonable level of inflation, 
averaging 8% between 2005 and 2014; comparatively high institutional quality, around the 
median in our sample between 2005 and 2014; a relatively well-developed banking sector 
with private credit to GDP averaging 29% between 2005 and 2014; and a comparatively low 
share of foreign bank ownership, averaging 29% between 2005 and 2013, which is below the 
mean and median in our sample. 
The development of Kenya’s LCBM has also widened the government’s policy room. In 
particular, the ability to rely on domestic long-term financing through LCBMs has allowed 
the government to finance infrastructure projects, an area in which many SSA countries face 
resource mobilization challenges. For example, between 2009 and 2014, the Kenyan 
government issued six LCBs targeted explicitly to infrastructure development. The reliance 
on domestic financing provides the government with funds over which it has significant 
discretion and reduces pressures to take into account the reactions of international financial 
markets or donors in choosing policies. 
This is not to say that the government is freed from pressures to maintain fiscal discipline. 
Kenya’s investor base is quite diverse, introducing an element of competition in the LCBM 
and aiding liquidity in the secondary market. As long as there remain other options besides 
LCBs for domestic investors, greater competition in the LCBM is likely to result in greater 
responsiveness of domestic investors to changes in the government’s perceived 
creditworthiness. If only a few dominant domestic banks held a significant portion of 
government securities, in contrast, each one would be affected significantly by a drop in 
prices, lowering the incentives to sell bonds quickly when the government’s perceived 
creditworthiness declines. Moreover, pressure to maintain fiscal discipline arises from 
Kenya’s vulnerability to economic, political and environmental shocks. Kenya’s economy 
has large agricultural and tourism sectors and is export-oriented, which means that it is 
SOAS Department of Economics Working Paper No 202 – 2017 
 
20 
 
vulnerable to shocks arising from drought, terrorism and declines in export demand. Adverse 
shocks may quickly impair its ability to service external as well as domestic debt. 
 
4.3 Nigeria 
In relative terms, Nigeria’s LCBM is smaller than the markets in Kenya and Ghana, with 
LCBs outstanding averaging 6% of GDP between 2005 and 2014 (African Financial Markets 
Initiative, 2016a). In absolute terms, however, it is much larger. Between 2010 and 2014, 
LCBs outstanding amounted to roughly to US$ 28 billion in Nigeria, compared to US$ 6 
billion in Ghana and US$ 9 billion in Kenya. The investor base, although mainly composed 
of residents, is relatively diversified. Whereas banks hold 39% of LCBs, the Central Bank of 
Nigeria holds 10% and the non-bank public, which includes the insurance sector, accounts for 
the remaining 52% (DMO, 2015: 42). So what has driven LCBM expansion in Nigeria? The 
quality of Nigerian institutions is notoriously limited, which does not help the deepening of 
LCBMs. However, Nigeria does score high with respect to other categories our empirical 
analysis has highlighted as important correlates of LCBM capitalization such as a 
comparatively well-developed and competitive financial sector. 
The depth of Nigeria’s LCBM also results from concerted efforts of the Nigerian authorities 
in the early 2000s to rely more on domestic rather than external debt and to develop a 
secondary market. In particular, Nigeria’s government, which had borrowed heavily from 
international banks and official creditors such as the World Bank in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, relied from 2004 onwards increasingly on domestic borrowing. While in 2004 78% of 
the public debt stock was foreign and 22% domestic, the corresponding figures for 2013 were 
16% external and 84% domestic public debt (DMO, 2007: 28; DMO, 2015: 17).14 The 
government was also successful in lengthening LCB tenors. While Treasury bills with a 
maturity of less than a year dominated domestic public debt before 2003, this is no longer the 
case. In 2015, for instance, the ratio of Treasury bonds to bills was 69 to 31. In addition, the 
government has increasingly issued longer-term bonds from the late 2000s onwards. Whereas 
10-year LCBs represented 20% of domestic issuance in 2007, they accounted for 55% of all 
tenors issued in 2012 (DMO, 2007: 61; African Financial Markets Initiative, 2016d). LCB 
maturities available today include 3, 5, 7, 10 and 20 years. 
The Nigerian case also demonstrates the opportunities and vulnerabilities arising from deep 
LCBMs. As with Kenya and Ghana, Nigeria’s ability to borrow from LCBMs reduced the 
reliance on external commercial and concessional financing to meet financing needs. In 
particular, the government used the proceeds of LCBs to fund its infrastructure deficit and 
special government stimulus initiatives between 2008 and 2014, when Nigeria felt the 
repercussions of the global financial crisis and a domestic financial crisis in 2010. Nigeria 
also largely avoided the vulnerabilities arising from borrowing at shorter maturities and at 
high costs from the LCBM, partly because a significant portion of this borrowing was not 
intended to fill financing gaps but rather to stimulate LCBM development (Blommestein and 
                                                           
14
 In the medium term the government seeks to decrease the ratio of domestic to external debt to 50-60%, in 
order to avoid a crowding out of private sector credit. This is evident from Nigeria’s past (2011 and 2013) and 
planned international bond issuance (DMO, 2015). 
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Horman, 2007: 228). Especially before Nigeria’s banking crisis in 2010, proceeds from oil 
revenues provided a comfortable cushion to finance recurrent expenditures. 
While Nigeria’s status as a major oil exporter has at times been a source of economic 
dynamism and financial market growth, it has, throughout Nigeria’s history, also been a 
regular source of economic volatility and vulnerability. To be sure, a sustained decline in oil 
revenues has a direct impact on the creditworthiness of a government which derives more 
than 60% of its revenues from oil exports. Moreover, a decline in oil revenues might also 
have indirect effects on debt sustainability, as Nigeria’s experience in 2015 shows, when 
foreign investors exited the LCBM. While the LCBM is, as in most other SSA economies, 
dominated by resident investors, foreign investment increased between 2011 and 2013 from 
0.7% to 15%, partly due to a search for higher yields in a low-interest-rate environment and 
spurred by the inclusion of Nigeria into major benchmark indices for LCBs in emerging 
markets, most notably the JP Morgan Government Bond Index for Emerging Markets and 
Barclays Emerging Markets Local Currency Government Index (Minto, 2012; UNCTAD, 
2016: 78). When the Nigerian government introduced restrictions on exchange transactions to 
deal with foreign exchange shortages arising from low oil-prices and revenues in 2014, 
foreign investors became concerned about the  liquidity of their investments. Such concerns 
prompted JP Morgan and Barclays to exclude Nigeria from their LCB indices in 2015 and 
2016 respectively. These exclusions, in turn, caused foreign investors to exit and LCB yields 
to rise. This episode illustrates once more the financial stability risks associated with foreign 
portfolio capital inflows, especially if domestic markets are still shallow. Foreign investment 
into LCBMs may certainly provide a welcome boost to liquidity and helps diversifying the 
investor base, but a rapid build-up of foreign investor positions as in Nigerian LCBMs 
between 2011 and 2013 can be problematic. The Nigerian case underlines the importance of 
building a base of ’patient capital’ that is less likely to exit as soon as market conditions 
deteriorate. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our empirical analysis of the drivers underlying the development of LCMs in SSA has 
yielded several interesting results. Importantly, our findings suggest that LCBM 
capitalization is not only related to democracy, institutional quality and financial 
development, but also to financial system structure in SSA. In particular, according to our 
estimation results, a high concentration in the banking sector correlates negatively with 
LCBM capitalization, possibly reflecting close cooperation/collusion between governments 
and a few dominant banks. A large presence of foreign-owned banks also correlates 
negatively with LCBM capitalization, arguably because foreign-owned banks enjoy more 
alternative investment opportunities abroad than domestic institutions. 
A further contribution made in this paper is our analysis of tenors and issue yields of LCBs in 
SSA. We find that both the size of a country’s banking sector and its broader financial 
development are positively correlated with average LCB tenors. Democracy, a proxy of 
government credibility, and a stable inflation environment matter too for attracting 
investments into longer-tenor LCBs. As regards LCB issue yields, financial and economic 
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development and, above all, inflation appear to be important factors. Using Ghana, Kenya 
and Nigeria as illustrative case studies, we have also highlighted the importance of 
diversifying the investor base in order to develop liquid and stable markets. While foreign 
investment into LCBMs can spur market development, at the same time it increases the risk 
of international financial contagion and capital flight in case of external shocks. Moreover, 
the domestic investor base needs to be sufficiently diversified in order to avoid too high a 
concentration of LCB holdings in the domestic banking sector, which could contain the seeds 
of a sovereign-debt-cum-banking-crisis. 
We acknowledge that limited within-country variation in our LCBM capitalization, LCB 
tenor and LCB issue yield samples is an important drawback to our econometric analysis. 
Longer time series, preferably at a higher frequency, would help to achieve better 
identification of any causal relations between different dimensions of LCBM development 
and the covariates we employ in this paper. Ideally, we would use individual bond-level data, 
allowing us to construct more detailed measures of LCBM development at various points in 
time. In addition, we believe it would be interesting to study secondary market variables such 
as LCBM turnover, bid-ask spreads and the evolution of secondary market yields of LCBs in 
SSA. Currently such data are, however, not available (not publicly at least) for most countries 
in the region. Other avenues for further research include a more in-depth inquiry of the 
effects of LCBM investor base composition and of the regional aspects of LCBM 
development in SSA. 
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Table 1: Baseline regression results for LCBM capitalization 
 POLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log GDP 0.360 0.430 0.401 0.497 -0.491 1.423*** -2.732 -3.291 2.941 2.823 -4.759 3.014 
 
[0.449] [0.414] [0.538] [0.594] [0.878] [0.435] [12.129] [12.188] [12.452] [13.576] [14.682] [16.360] 
Log GDP per cap. 0.982* 0.926* 0.974* 0.252 0.397 -0.957+ 6.776 7.379 -0.122 0.442 9.166 0.645 
 
[0.558] [0.526] [0.529] [0.729] [0.758] [0.720] [14.294] [14.339] [14.366] [16.394] [17.539] [20.005] 
Av. fiscal balance -0.399** -0.367*** -0.386*** -0.463*** -0.371** -0.466*** 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.025 -0.093 
 
[0.149] [0.124] [0.120] [0.113] [0.160] [0.151] [0.074] [0.075] [0.081] [0.080] [0.094] [0.072] 
Log inflation 5.233 3.597 3.606 -3.437 -0.196 -2.230 4.587 4.437 6.887 9.502 9.419 12.771 
 
[4.480] [4.216] [4.485] [4.310] [5.332] [4.153] [7.546] [7.558] [7.389] [7.694] [9.225] [12.167] 
Cap. acc. openness 0.554+ 0.536+ 0.572 0.310 -0.054 0.700+ 1.198 1.212 0.929 -1.014 -0.728 -0.876 
 
[0.397] [0.405] [0.446] [0.551] [0.615] [0.468] [1.739] [1.741] [1.487] [0.977] [1.068] [1.065] 
British legal origins -0.062 -0.066 -0.187 -0.741 -0.220 -1.671       
 
[0.773] [0.717] [0.837] [0.918] [0.840] [1.335] 
      
Democracy  2.760+ 2.965+ 3.298+ 2.791+ 0.316  2.535 -1.958 -1.119 -2.605 1.146 
 
 
[2.026] [2.075] [2.207] [1.945] [1.821] 
 
[3.291] [3.945] [4.110] [4.362] [4.301] 
Institutional quality   0.029 0.740 -0.051 2.658   13.128** 10.006* 7.674+ 11.405* 
 
  
[2.071] [1.909] [1.922] [2.167] 
  
[6.308] [5.619] [4.786] [6.518] 
Private credit 0.221*** 0.211*** 0.210***    0.276 0.276 0.244    
 
[0.028] [0.031] [0.036] 
   
[0.221] [0.221] [0.199] 
   
Fin. development    52.504*** 56.292*** 51.072***    57.163+ 74.842+ 51.027 
 
   
[7.595] [8.975] [8.895] 
   
[42.629] [46.113] [55.909] 
Bank concentration     -0.097*      -0.089+  
 
    
[0.057] 
     
[0.052] 
 
Foreign bank share      -0.035+      -0.063 
 
     
[0.024] 
     
[0.082] 
VIX 0.001 -0.004 0.004 0.005 0.022 0.006 -0.047+ -0.046 -0.062+ -0.071* -0.059+ -0.059 
 
[0.036] [0.035] [0.038] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.036] [0.036] [0.037] [0.038] [0.041] [0.046] 
Constant -31.898+ -25.521 -26.036 7.631 1.511 9.374 -61.786 -65.807 -57.291 -72.003 -105.418 -89.617 
 
[21.502] [19.444] [21.370] [22.246] [25.209] [20.913] [90.237] [90.167] [89.690] [107.721] [120.003] [148.153] 
Observations 270 270 254 261 242 232 270 270 254 261 242 232 
Countries 27 27 26 27 26 23 27 27 26 27 26 23 
Overall F p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.000 
R2/R2-within (FE) 0.782 0.786 0.792 0.755 0.771 0.781 0.354 0.355 0.367 0.321 0.428 0.297 
Intra-class corr. ρ       0.828 0.852 0.789 0.745 0.941 0.758 
Hausman p-value       0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is outstanding LCBs (% of GDP). Sample countries, years and variables as defined in the text and Tables A1 and A2. All independent variables are one-year lagged, 
except for VIX. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10; +p < 0.20. 
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Table 2: Baseline regression results for average LCB tenors 
 POLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log GDP -0.054 0.014 -0.043 -0.025 0.281 -0.125 0.278 5.672* 6.070* 3.858 4.460 6.888* 2.061 6.697** 
 
[0.202] [0.201] [0.303] [0.283] [0.394] [0.290] [0.355] [2.942] [3.066] [3.766] [3.614] [3.913] [3.891] [3.092] 
Log GDP per cap. 0.151 0.113 0.126 -0.005 -0.202 0.230 0.244 -5.154 -5.588+ -2.856 -3.555 -6.477 -0.770 -5.874+ 
 
[0.359] [0.320] [0.347] [0.284] [0.321] [0.379] [0.352] [3.925] [4.029] [4.771] [4.624] [5.149] [4.930] [4.171] 
Av. fiscal balance 0.059 0.081 0.107+ 0.089 0.103+ 0.143+ 0.084 -0.011 -0.008 0.006 0.010 0.037 0.042 0.011 
 
[0.073] [0.074] [0.070] [0.071] [0.078] [0.084] [0.107] [0.057] [0.056] [0.059] [0.056] [0.048] [0.048] [0.058] 
Log inflation -5.034 -5.997 -7.217 -9.330+ -8.911+ -9.805+ -13.408** 3.146 3.186 1.518 0.579 3.038 1.933 -3.470 
 
[4.943] [5.466] [5.985] [5.941] [5.815] [6.322] [6.342] [3.493] [3.499] [3.693] [3.934] [3.481] [4.238] [3.212] 
Cap. acc. openness 0.121 0.083 0.055 0.012 0.106 -0.005 -0.087 -0.005 -0.009 0.191 0.749 0.619 0.675 0.232 
 
[0.336] [0.309] [0.362] [0.330] [0.332] [0.353] [0.368] [1.319] [1.321] [1.272] [0.813] [0.764] [0.798] [0.853] 
British legal origins 0.532 0.505 0.723 0.638 0.447 0.902 0.806        
 
[0.695] [0.703] [0.836] [0.745] [0.790] [0.714] [0.752] 
       
Democracy  2.023+ 2.334+ 2.705* 2.480+ 3.020* 3.193**  -1.413 -0.290 -0.823 -0.909 1.057 -0.886 
 
 
[1.323] [1.552] [1.362] [1.518] [1.534] [1.361] 
 
[1.359] [1.815] [1.643] [1.528] [2.049] [1.637] 
Institutional quality   -0.193 -0.241 0.102 -0.792 0.973   -3.608 -2.446 -0.466 -1.774 -1.935 
 
  
[1.612] [1.437] [1.534] [1.680] [1.329] 
  
[3.511] [3.266] [2.805] [2.932] [2.649] 
Private credit 0.053*** 0.046*** 0.046**     -0.040 -0.040 -0.029     
 
[0.010] [0.013] [0.017] 
    
[0.046] [0.046] [0.040] 
    
Fin. development    11.632** 11.628** 11.967**     -7.754 -7.707 -0.941  
 
   
[4.775] [5.147] [5.300] 
    
[14.458] [14.208] [17.317] 
 
Bank concentration     0.019       0.012   
 
    
[0.022] 
      
[0.014] 
  
Foreign bank share      0.010       0.029  
 
     
[0.018] 
      
[0.023] 
 
LCBM capitalization       0.039       -0.093*** 
 
      
[0.068] 
      
[0.031] 
VIX 0.039** 0.037** 0.030* 0.024+ 0.020 0.015 0.036** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.041** 0.038** 0.032** 0.024+ 0.039** 
 
[0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.015] [0.012] [0.015] [0.015] 
Constant 26.645 30.114 36.064 46.105+ 43.210+ 47.255+ 61.456* 14.797 17.750 16.443 23.473 21.826 -2.007 51.619** 
 
[23.154] [25.574] [28.349] [28.566] [28.557] [30.038] [30.436] [26.229] [26.903] [27.192] [28.611] [28.111] [32.020] [24.576] 
Observations 249 249 234 241 225 218 222 249 249 234 241 225 218 222 
Countries 27 27 26 27 26 23 25 27 27 26 27 26 23 25 
Overall F p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.011 0.000 
R2/R2-within (FE) 0.432 0.454 0.467 0.465 0.487 0.487 0.388 0.155 0.159 0.184 0.179 0.188 0.218 0.258 
Intra-class corr. ρ        0.975 0.978 0.965 0.967 0.985 0.878 0.986 
Hausman p-value        0.010 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is average tenor of outstanding LCBs (years). Sample countries, years and variables as defined in the text and Tables A1 and A2. All independent variables are one-
year lagged, except for VIX. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10; +p < 0.20. 
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Table 3: Baseline regression results for average LCB issue yields 
 POLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log GDP 0.633+ 0.640+ 1.395*** 1.271*** 0.864** 0.781*** 0.937* 0.833** 7.024 6.633 11.685 10.835 7.616 6.622 9.431 23.756** 
 
[0.415] [0.419] [0.333] [0.368] [0.378] [0.226] [0.446] [0.278] [11.458] [12.096] [9.667] [8.940] [9.064] [7.124] [9.788] [8.019] 
Log GDP per cap. -1.489** -1.541** -2.571*** -2.347*** -2.419*** -1.592*** -2.881*** -2.227*** -8.959 -8.565 -14.217 -12.504 -11.170 -8.905 -12.159 -28.569** 
 
[0.509] [0.513] [0.469] [0.504] [0.483] [0.450] [0.504] [0.359] [13.176] [13.743] [11.126] [11.093] [11.330] [8.984] [11.159] [9.744] 
Av. fiscal balance -0.223 -0.211 -0.214+ -0.211+ -0.178 -0.256* -0.265+ -0.181+ -0.131+ -0.136 -0.125 -0.113 -0.103 -0.084 -0.167 -0.096 
 
[0.189] [0.173] [0.129] [0.119] [0.138] [0.136] [0.172] [0.132] [0.094] [0.101] [0.103] [0.097] [0.086] [0.116] [0.128] [0.115] 
Log inflation 34.332*** 33.905*** 23.412*** 24.937*** 21.313** 17.083** 28.435** 19.958** 16.545** 16.590** 16.322** 16.719** 13.160+ 11.188+ 10.733+ 0.311 
 
[7.566] [7.082] [5.617] [5.941] [8.761] [5.708] [10.024] [7.497] [5.636] [6.016] [7.306] [6.776] [7.550] [6.581] [6.504] [6.409] 
Cap. acc. openness -0.150 -0.154 -0.411+ -0.320 -0.556+ -0.528** -0.283 -0.277 -2.088 -2.083 -2.109 -0.404 0.113 -0.813 -0.270 0.512 
 
[0.272] [0.282] [0.258] [0.275] [0.343] [0.225] [0.287] [0.213] [2.468] [2.479] [2.107] [1.193] [0.976] [0.840] [1.299] [1.202] 
British legal origins 0.266 0.395 0.361 1.435+ 1.529+ 1.932** 1.467+ 2.363**         
 
[1.077] [1.184] [0.753] [0.912] [0.878] [0.654] [0.867] [0.804] 
        
Democracy  0.988 -0.817 0.152 0.541 3.324*** -0.110 1.921+  3.248 1.966 -1.659 -0.759 -9.759+ 8.335 -6.572 
 
 
[1.534] [1.238] [1.283] [1.672] [0.948] [1.140] [1.124] 
 
[10.845] [7.488] [6.109] [4.822] [6.079] [9.950] [5.535] 
Institutional quality   5.764*** 5.582*** 5.185*** 2.670* 4.134** 2.667**   7.581+ 10.734* 6.246 9.596* 6.163 1.786 
 
  
[1.358] [1.520] [1.499] [1.374] [1.652] [0.905] 
  
[5.244] [5.203] [5.698] [4.429] [4.612] [3.455] 
Private credit -0.029+ -0.031+ -0.053**      -0.104+ -0.103+ -0.149**      
 
[0.019] [0.020] [0.019] 
     
[0.073] [0.074] [0.055] 
     
Fin. development    -12.992** -12.007** -12.356**      -44.523* -43.073** -26.485   
 
   
[5.773] [4.319] [4.487] 
     
[21.456] [18.253] [24.119] 
  
Bank concentration     -0.032+        -0.059***    
 
    
[0.021] 
       
[0.017] 
   
Foreign bank share      0.050***        0.233***   
 
     
[0.010] 
       
[0.063] 
  
LCBM capitaliz.       -0.056        -0.073  
 
      
[0.048] 
       
[0.055] 
 
Av. tenor of LCBs        -0.503***        -0.479 
 
       
[0.115] 
       
[0.381] 
VIX 0.011 0.008 -0.010 -0.015 -0.013 0.011 0.007 -0.020 0.025 0.025 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.029 0.023 0.023 
 
[0.046] [0.045] [0.035] [0.032] [0.038] [0.033] [0.036] [0.028] [0.038] [0.038] [0.035] [0.033] [0.042] [0.038] [0.035] [0.036] 
Constant -140.2*** -138.6*** -92.26*** -101.2*** -79.968* -69.047** -112.26** -72.908* -15.302 -19.971 -1.637 -14.012 11.500 -13.962 7.951 164.764** 
 
[37.192] [35.239] [27.667] [29.084] [40.858] [28.427] [47.730] [34.782] [79.887] [88.978] [74.596] [78.689] [77.172] [58.482] [80.727] [69.682] 
Observations 123 123 113 117 104 104 111 106 123 123 113 117 104 104 111 106 
Countries 13 13 12 13 13 12 13 13 13 13 12 13 13 12 13 13 
Overall F p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 N/A 0.000 0.000 0.095 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2/R2-within (FE) 0.568 0.570 0.670 0.645 0.660 0.636 0.611 0.669 0.148 0.149 0.203 0.187 0.184 0.300 0.119 0.140 
Intra-class corr. ρ         0.966 0.961 0.988 0.982 0.976 0.954 0.976 0.997 
Hausman p-value         N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Notes: Dependent variable is average issue yield of LCBs issued over the year (%). Sample countries, years and variables as defined in the text and Tables A1 and A2. All independent 
variables are one-year lagged, except for VIX. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10; +p < 0.20. 
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Table 4: Robustness results for LCBM capitalization regressions 
 POLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log GDP 0.720* 0.211 0.801+ 0.421 0.311 0.383 0.510 7.744 10.132 4.634 1.888 3.183 -30.318 7.301 
 
[0.390] [0.521] [0.480] [0.616] [0.607] [0.606] [0.481] [8.615] [8.622] [13.647] [13.689] [13.770] [32.865] [11.644] 
Log GDP per cap. 0.490 0.769 -0.242 0.163 0.252 0.055 0.558 -5.634 -8.022 -2.218 0.875 -0.062 28.858 -4.579 
 
[0.484] [0.644] [0.804] [0.672] [0.708] [0.748] [1.056] [10.509] [10.391] [16.490] [16.736] [16.703] [32.073] [14.165] 
Av. fiscal balance -0.360** -0.514*** -0.453*** -0.451*** -0.436*** -0.510*** -0.407*** -0.041 -0.044 0.009 0.003 -0.001 -0.029 -0.010 
 
[0.142] [0.113] [0.122] [0.106] [0.105] [0.135] [0.122] [0.080] [0.083] [0.078] [0.078] [0.079] [0.086] [0.073] 
Log inflation 0.982 -5.256 -2.432 -3.691 -5.838+ -5.491 -7.744 4.131 5.031 9.896 7.586 9.705 0.938 14.868 
 
[4.570] [5.098] [4.855] [4.729] [4.417] [5.559] [9.736] [7.609] [7.160] [7.998] [7.179] [7.750] [9.643] [11.678] 
Cap. acc. openness 0.299 0.219 0.458 0.254 0.213 0.292 0.028 -0.122 -1.015 -0.703 -1.078 -1.030 -1.301 -1.123 
 
[0.523] [0.690] [0.558] [0.555] [0.562] [0.544] [0.558] [1.916] [0.919] [1.087] [0.928] [0.986] [1.149] [0.966] 
British legal origins 0.681 0.263 -1.151 -0.481 -0.220 -0.555 0.138        
 
[1.060] [1.222] [1.138] [1.087] [0.863] [0.929] [1.143] 
       
Democracy 2.067 4.368* 3.084+ 3.626+ 3.300+ 3.318+ 2.823+ 0.848 1.122 -0.866 -0.953 -1.142 -2.515 0.608 
 
[1.675] [2.148] [2.031] [2.631] [2.162] [2.332] [2.010] [3.224] [3.524] [4.019] [3.739] [4.132] [5.587] [4.033] 
Institutional quality -0.513 -0.452 0.542 0.646 0.618 0.907 0.744 4.817* 3.712 9.493+ 9.856* 10.178* 10.876* 12.015+ 
 
[1.530] [1.769] [1.976] [2.016] [1.905] [1.933] [1.883] [2.702] [3.089] [5.616] [5.616] [5.607] [5.443] [7.394] 
Private credit 0.282***       0.155+       
 
[0.075] 
      
[0.093] 
      
Fin. development  39.321***  52.481*** 54.644*** 53.792*** 56.406***  22.389  60.123+ 57.668+ -3.059 69.990+ 
 
 
[13.409] 
 
[7.768] [7.362] [7.792] [7.987] 
 
[29.458] 
 
[42.472] [42.716] [26.406] [47.048] 
Financial institutions   34.751**       35.939+     
 
  
[14.476] 
      
[22.873] 
    
Financial markets   18.637*       10.290     
 
  
[10.246] 
      
[24.033] 
    
Inflation volatility    -0.396       -0.961+    
    
[0.653] 
      
[0.651] 
   
Exch. rate volatility     -0.342**       0.043   
 
    
[0.165] 
      
[0.178] 
  
Official external debt       0.030       0.031 
 
      
[0.040] 
      
[0.026] 
External bonds       -0.249*       -0.166 
       
[0.142] 
      
[0.149] 
Other external debt       0.082       -0.346 
       
[0.323] 
      
[0.469] 
VIX 0.016 0.025 0.008 0.012 0.034  0.009 -0.026 -0.028 -0.059+ -0.059+ -0.073+  -0.076+ 
 
[0.026] [0.029] [0.035] [0.035] [0.036] 
 
[0.036] [0.030] [0.038] [0.037] [0.041] [0.046] 
 
[0.049] 
Constant -11.886 15.066 4.806 9.722 19.378 12.152 24.506 -4.609 3.160 -59.422 -63.419 -70.679 -157.319 -78.984 
 
[21.577] [26.590] [23.776] [24.310] [22.524] [27.278] [50.927] [68.091] [67.476] [107.212] [110.126] [109.230] [151.290] [95.956] 
Observations 229 236 261 260 260 261 248 229 236 261 260 260 261 248 
Countries 24 25 27 27 27 27 26 24 25 27 27 27 27 26 
Overall F p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.022 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
R2/R2-within (FE) 0.656 0.539 0.759 0.757 0.759 0.776 0.774 0.426 0.395 0.326 0.327 0.319 0.402 0.386 
Intra-class corr. ρ        0.944 0.970 0.740 0.745 0.749 0.994 0.893 
Hausman p-value        0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is outstanding LCBs (% of GDP). Sample countries, years and variables as defined in the text and Tables A1 and A2; columns (1) and (2) exclude South Africa and 
Mauritius; column (6) includes year dummies. All independent variables are one-year lagged, except for VIX, inflation volatility, exchange rate volatility, and external debt variables. Standard 
errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10; +p < 0.20.
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Table 5: Robustness results for average LCB tenor regressions 
 POLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log GDP -0.038 -0.105 0.421+ -0.092 0.084 -0.102 -0.316 7.007** 6.557* 4.149 4.665 4.658 -2.125 3.528 
 
[0.314] [0.303] [0.270] [0.290] [0.255] [0.314] [0.286] [3.131] [3.493] [3.650] [3.720] [3.759] [6.535] [4.758] 
Log GDP per cap. 0.072 0.112 -0.665* -0.155 -0.019 -0.144 0.098 -6.609+ -5.954 -3.090 -4.010 -3.930 2.787 -2.728 
 
[0.379] [0.380] [0.384] [0.291] [0.281] [0.308] [0.333] [4.147] [4.638] [4.609] [4.804] [4.837] [6.239] [6.086] 
Av. fiscal balance 0.124+ 0.100+ 0.100* 0.101+ 0.074 0.134+ 0.022 0.033 0.031 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.028 0.024 
 
[0.079] [0.072] [0.057] [0.068] [0.066] [0.079] [0.068] [0.054] [0.050] [0.058] [0.056] [0.056] [0.055] [0.074] 
Log inflation -7.048 -8.724+ -7.547+ -10.025+ -6.807 -9.144 -10.369* 1.669 1.468 0.515 0.473 0.601 1.756 -3.865 
 
[6.183] [6.177] [4.931] [6.071] [5.800] [7.739] [5.100] [3.552] [3.802] [3.744] [3.808] [4.136] [4.320] [3.064] 
Cap. acc. openness 0.043 0.069 0.217 -0.009 0.046 0.019 0.158 0.215 0.651 0.686 0.731 0.780 0.809+ 0.003 
 
[0.372] [0.361] [0.330] [0.321] [0.338] [0.323] [0.344] [1.333] [0.807] [0.746] [0.810] [0.770] [0.590] [1.230] 
British legal origins 0.650 0.593 -0.079 0.883 0.313 0.858 0.344        
 
[0.861] [0.761] [0.660] [0.733] [0.830] [0.771] [0.781] 
       
Democracy 2.327+ 2.955* 2.403* 3.143** 2.747** 2.984* 3.733* -1.596 -1.762+ -0.873 -0.841 -0.853 -1.018 -0.108 
 
[1.633] [1.471] [1.281] [1.418] [1.333] [1.452] [1.964] [1.252] [1.233] [1.642] [1.578] [1.629] [1.674] [1.465] 
Institutional quality 0.142 -0.111 -0.422 -0.428 -0.083 -0.238 -1.680 0.588 1.594 -2.330 -2.259 -2.155 -3.045 -5.650+ 
 
[1.611] [1.436] [1.161] [1.503] [1.398] [1.491] [1.802] [1.838] [1.795] [3.296] [3.312] [3.359] [3.393] [3.462] 
Private credit 0.040       -0.081***       
 
[0.037] 
      
[0.012] 
      
Fin. development  7.651  11.439** 10.047** 12.337**   -25.633***  -6.835 -7.557 -19.046+  
 
 
[8.211] 
 
[4.650] [4.222] [4.927] 
  
[6.829] 
 
[14.140] [14.451] [14.172] 
 
Financial institutions   16.792***       -5.220     
 
  
[5.387] 
      
[7.673] 
    
Financial markets   -4.355       -0.616     
 
  
[3.953] 
      
[11.085] 
    
Inflation volatility    -0.620+       -0.182    
    
[0.376] 
      
[0.318] 
   
Exch. rate volatility     0.284*       -0.123   
 
    
[0.159] 
      
[0.120] 
  
Insurance assets       0.121***       -0.007 
 
      
[0.032] 
      
[0.049] 
VIX 0.031* 0.024+ 0.026+ 0.032* -0.002  0.059*** 0.033** 0.038*** 0.036** 0.041*** 0.052**  0.045*** 
 
[0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.026] 
 
[0.015] [0.014] [0.013] [0.017] [0.015] [0.021] 
 
[0.015] 
Constant 35.266 42.875+ 40.178* 50.981* 33.965 47.632 52.996** 30.034 27.601 21.187 26.301 25.093 -6.875 44.170 
 
[29.375] [29.728] [23.532] [29.693] [27.661] [37.067] [24.659] [24.257] [26.838] [30.733] [28.565] [28.873] [39.564] [35.629] 
Observations 222 229 241 240 240 241 195 222 229 241 240 240 241 195 
Countries 25 26 27 27 27 27 22 25 26 27 27 27 27 22 
Overall F p-value 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.006 0.023 0.000 0.013 
R2/R2-within (FE) 0.300 0.305 0.529 0.478 0.477 0.489 0.527 0.225 0.239 0.180 0.175 0.179 0.232 0.212 
Intra-class corr. ρ        0.989 0.987 0.963 0.970 0.970 0.950 0.972 
Hausman p-value        0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is average tenor of outstanding LCBs (years). Sample countries, years and variables as defined in the text and Tables A1 and A2columns (1) and (2) exclude South 
Africa; column (6) includes year dummies. All independent variables are one-year lagged, except for VIX, inflation volatility, and exchange rate volatility. Standard errors, clustered at the 
country level, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10; +p < 0.20.
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Table 6: Robustness results for average LCB issue yield regressions 
 POLS FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log GDP 0.950*** 0.666+ 1.016** 1.305*** 1.635*** 1.418*** 0.341 25.850** 23.282** 10.900 12.230+ 12.055 25.070+ 11.940* 
 
[0.284] [0.407] [0.404] [0.338] [0.471] [0.412] [0.324] [8.800] [8.552] [8.840] [8.919] [9.345] [15.158] [6.469] 
Log GDP per cap. -2.103*** -1.866*** -2.081*** -1.804*** -2.335*** -1.951*** -0.760+ -30.712** -27.947** -12.627 -13.551 -13.600 -24.173+ -12.755+ 
 
[0.302] [0.417] [0.531] [0.546] [0.470] [0.598] [0.547] [10.138] [10.590] [10.956] [11.021] [11.375] [15.129] [7.875] 
Av. fiscal balance -0.074 -0.091 -0.195+ -0.210* -0.232* -0.233+ -0.197** -0.016 -0.021 -0.113 -0.116+ -0.108 -0.094 -0.132** 
 
[0.101] [0.095] [0.114] [0.111] [0.116] [0.151] [0.083] [0.055] [0.060] [0.096] [0.082] [0.084] [0.098] [0.046] 
Log inflation 14.203* 14.335* 23.997*** 27.958*** 26.864*** 26.908*** 
 
3.358 4.742+ 16.688** 20.803** 18.864** 19.314*** 
 
 
[6.963] [7.323] [5.204] [6.533] [7.230] [6.350] 
 
[3.939] [3.221] [6.893] [8.463] [6.635] [6.015] 
 
Cap. acc. openness -0.032 0.123 -0.406+ -0.338 -0.283 -0.300 -0.374+ -0.378 0.364 -0.376 -0.280 -0.475 -0.974 0.206 
 
[0.186] [0.242] [0.254] [0.258] [0.274] [0.257] [0.265] [1.761] [1.118] [1.190] [1.148] [0.995] [1.342] [0.480] 
British legal origins 0.204 1.493+ 1.771** 0.994 0.585 1.234 0.245 
       
 
[1.277] [1.059] [0.759] [0.926] [0.973] [1.065] [1.062] 
       
Democracy -1.894** -1.424+ 0.461 -0.834 0.218 -0.548 -0.987 -5.676+ -6.825** -1.558 -0.747 -4.769 -2.267 -6.087 
 
[0.792] [0.879] [1.068] [1.206] [1.104] [1.461] [1.174] [3.322] [2.391] [6.211] [5.920] [8.879] [9.844] [5.300] 
Institutional quality 3.142*** 2.331 5.204*** 5.502*** 6.239*** 5.400*** 0.201 9.343* 8.078+ 10.593* 10.894* 10.174* 11.201** 2.466 
 
[0.904] [1.863] [1.509] [1.257] [1.712] [1.623] [1.801] [4.980] [4.876] [5.129] [5.275] [5.327] [5.039] [3.707] 
Private credit -0.031* 
      
-0.127* 
      
 
[0.016] 
      
[0.057] 
      
Fin. development 
 
-4.402 
 
-13.054** -17.837** -14.243** -0.992 
 
-23.482 
 
-44.936* -45.657* -14.689 -18.999** 
  
[6.923] 
 
[5.179] [7.648] [5.604] [5.359] 
 
[22.166] 
 
[21.127] [20.988] [35.073] [7.161] 
Financial institutions 
  
-10.004** 
      
-21.822* 
    
   
[4.100] 
      
[10.915] 
    
Financial markets 
  
-2.210 
      
-24.261 
    
   
[6.066] 
      
[23.748] 
    
Inflation volatility 
   
1.623+ 
      
1.309+ 
   
 
   
[0.982] 
      
[0.818] 
   
Exch. rate volatility 
    
0.483 
      
0.428 
  
 
    
[0.385] 
      
[0.511] 
  
Central bank rate 
      
0.751*** 
      
0.764*** 
 
      
[0.155] 
      
[0.195] 
VIX -0.025 -0.028 -0.016 -0.036 -0.057 
 
-0.006 -0.009 0.002 0.002 -0.017 -0.036 
 
0.004 
 
[0.027] [0.028] [0.032] [0.042] [0.069] 
 
[0.028] [0.036] [0.031] [0.038] [0.041] [0.069] 
 
[0.026] 
Constant -46.080+ -47.838+ -97.035*** -119.09*** -111.60*** -110.05*** 8.584* 152.109** 133.385** -12.995 -30.760 -16.115 23.985 72.375+ 
 
[31.697] [33.150] [26.004] [32.655] [35.807] [31.659] [4.354] [48.356] [55.112] [79.698] [72.050] [69.887] [66.434] [45.028] 
Observations 94 98 117 116 116 117 85 94 98 117 116 116 117 85 
Countries 10 11 13 13 13 13 12 10 11 13 13 13 13 12 
Overall F p-value N/A 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 N/A 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 N/A 0.000 
R2/R2-within (FE) 0.676 0.646 0.648 0.668 0.663 0.687 0.829 0.354 0.295 0.187 0.219 0.213 0.308 0.598 
Intra-class corr. ρ 
       
0.999 0.998 0.982 0.987 0.986 0.997 0.995 
Hausman p-value 
       
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is average tenor of outstanding LCBs (years). Sample countries, years and variables as defined in the text and Tables A1 and A2columns (1) and (2) exclude Ghana 
and Mozambique; column (6) includes year dummies. All independent variables are one-year lagged, except for VIX, inflation volatility, exchange rate volatility, and central bank policy rate. 
Standard errors, clustered at the country level, are reported in brackets. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10; +p < 0.20. 
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Figure 1: Local currency bond market development in SSA, 2000-2014 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors with data from the African Financial Markets Initiative (2016a). 
Notes: For presentation purposes, only six largest LCBMs (relative to GDP, evaluated over 2000-2014) are 
shown separately. Thick black line represents unweighted average of 28countries (cf. sample in Appendix Table 
A1). Range represents the minimum and maximum values of LCBM capitalization for 22 countries, excluding 
six largest LCBMs. 
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Figure 2: Domestic debt (% of total debt) for selected SSA countries 
 
Source: Compiled by the authors with data from various IMF country reports. 
Note: Data for Burundi, Gambia and Nigeria are for 2013. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Country-year samples by dependent variable 
  Dependent variable (available years) 
Country ISO 3 code LCBM 
capitalization 
Average LCB tenors Average LCB issue yields 
Angola AGO 2005-2014 2005-2014 N/A 
Benin BEN 2007-2014 2007-2014 N/A 
Botswana BWA 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003, 2008-2014 
Burkina Faso  BFA 2000-2014 2000, 2001, 2003-2014 N/A 
Burundi BDI 2007-2014 2007-2014 N/A 
Cabo Verde CPV 2000-2014 2000-2014 2000-2014 
Cameroon CMR 2010-2014 2010-2014 N/A 
Chad TCD 2011-2014 2011 N/A 
Cote d'Ivoire CIV 2000-2014 2000-2014 N/A 
Gabon GAB 2007-2014 2007-2014 N/A 
Ghana GHA 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 
Kenya KEN 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 
Lesotho LSO 2010-2014 2010-2014 2010-2014 
Malawi MWI 2000-2012 2000-2008 N/A 
Mali MLI 2008-2014 2008-2014 N/A 
Mauritius MUS 2000-2014 2000-2014 2004-2014 
Mozambique MOZ 2000-2014 2000-2004 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 
2008-2010, 2013, 2014 
Namibia NAM 2000-2014 2000-2014 2000-2014 
Niger NER 2009-2014 2009-2014 N/A 
Nigeria  NGA 2003-2014 2003-2014 2009-2014 
Rwanda RWA 2008-2014 2008-2014 2008, 2010, 2011, 2014 
Senegal SEN 2005-2014 2005-2014 N/A 
South Africa  ZAF 2003-2014 2003-2014 2011-2014 
Swaziland SWZ 2010-2014 2010-2014 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014 
Tanzania TZA 2002-2014 2002-2014 2002-2014 
The Gambia GMB 2010-2013 2010 N/A 
Togo TGO 2006-2014 2006-2014 N/A 
Uganda  UGA 2004-2014 2004-2014 2004-2014 
Notes: ‘N/A’ means ‘not available’. 
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Table A2: Variable names, definitions, sources and descriptive statistics 
   Observations    Standard deviation 
Variable Definition Source Total Countries Years Mean Min  Max overall between within 
Dependent            
LCBM 
capitalization 
Year-end outstanding amount of local currency 
Treasury bonds (in % of GDP) 
AFMI (2016a) 282 28 2000-
2014 
6.681 0.026 40.343 8.560 7.033 4.202 
Average tenor 
of LCBs 
Weighted average tenor of year-end outstanding 
local currency Treasury bonds (in years) 
AFMI (2016a) 261 28 2000-
2014 
6.391 1.512 17.098 2.739 2.323 1.345 
Average issue 
yield of LCBs 
Weighted average yield at issuance of all local 
currency Treasury bonds issued over the year (in 
%) 
AFMI (2016a) 128 14 2000-
2014 
10.971 4.231 24.264 4.236 3.373 2.465 
Independent            
Log GDP Logarithm of GDP (in current US$ billion) IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO)  420 28 1999-
2013 
2.054 -0.679 6.257 1.412 1.342 0.502 
Log GDP per 
capita 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (in current US$) WEO 420 28 1999-
2013 
6.830 4.691 9.392 1.087 1.023 0.411 
Fiscal balance 3-year moving average of general government net 
lending/borrowing (in % of GDP) 
WEO; IMF Fiscal Monitor (FM) 409 28 1999-
2013 
-1.616 -
17.840 
13.688 4.124 2.573 3.262 
Log inflation Logarithm of the y-o-y change in average 
consumer prices 
WEO 420 28 1999-
2013 
4.676 4.517 6.052 0.121 0.080 0.092 
Capital account 
openness 
Chinn-Ito coding of restrictions on cross-border 
financial transactions based on IMF Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER) 
Chinn-Ito KAOPEN database 420 28 1999-
2013 
0.292 0 1 0.292 0.292 0.054 
British legal 
origins 
Dummy which equals 1 for countries with a British 
common law heritage and 0 otherwise 
Andrei Schleifer’s personal website: 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer 
420 28 2000-
2014 
0.429 0 1 0.495 0.504 0 
Democracy 0-1 normalized (revised) Polity 2 score University of Maryland Polity IV Project 
database 
420 28 1999-
2013 
0.631 0.050 1 0.265 0.258 0.076 
Institutional 
quality 
Unweighted sum of 0-1 normalized scores on four 
WGI dimensions: ‘control of corruption’, 
‘government effectiveness’, ‘regulatory quality’ 
and ‘rule of law’ 
World Bank World Governance Indicators 
(WGI) 
351 27 2001; 
2003-
2013 
1.622 0.712 2.688 0.436 0.433 0.097 
Private sector 
credit 
Domestic private sector credit by deposit money 
banks and other financial institutions (in % of 
GDP) 
World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database (GFDD) 
412 28 1999-
2013 
22.841 1.140 150.210 26.680 26.351 5.563 
Financial 
development 
Composite index of financial development, 
capturing the depth, access and efficiency of 
financial institutions and financial markets 
Svirydzenka (2016) 420 28 1999-
2013 
0.140 0.046 0.637 0.105 0.105 0.020 
Bank 
concentration 
Assets of 3 largest commercial banks (in % of total 
commercial banking assets) 
GFDD 371 28 1999-
2013 
78.058 23.324 100 18.326 15.353 10.637 
Foreign bank 
share 
Number of foreign owned banks (as % of total 
number of banks in the economy)  
GFDD 345 23 1999-
2013 
54.609 0 100 24.668 23.869 7.873 
VIX Yearly averaged Chicago Board of Options 
Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index measuring the 
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Federal 
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) 
420 28 2000-
2014 
20.941 12.810 32.690 6.367 0 6.367 
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Figure A1: Bivariate scatter plots – LCBM capitalization vs. explanatory variables 
 
Notes: Sample countries, years and variables as defined in the text and Tables A1 and A2. All explanatory variables are one-year lagged. Grey dots are data points for South Africa and 
Mauritius. Full lines represent best linear fit for whole sample, dashed lines for sample excluding South Africa and Mauritius. 
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Figure A2: Bivariate scatter plots – Average LCB tenors vs. explanatory variables 
 
Notes: Sample countries, years and variables as defined in the text and Tables A1 and A2. All explanatory variables are one-year lagged. Grey dots are data points for South Africa. Full lines 
represent best linear fit for whole sample, dashed lines for sample excluding South Africa. 
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Figure A3: Bivariate scatter plots – Average LCB issue yields vs. explanatory variables 
 
Notes: Sample countries, years and variables as defined in the text and Tables A1 and A2. All explanatory variables are one-year lagged. Grey dots are data points for Ghana and Mozambique. 
Full lines represent best linear fit for whole sample, dashed lines for sample excluding Ghana and Mozambique.
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Figure A4: Bivariate scatter plots – LCBM capitalization vs. average tenors vs. average 
issue yields 
 
Notes: Sample countries, years and variables as defined in the text and Tables A1 and A2. Variables on x-axis 
are one-year lagged. Grey dots are data points for South Africa and Mauritius in panel (a); for Ghana, 
Mozambique, South Africa and Mauritius in panel (b); and for Ghana, Mozambique and South Africa in panel 
(c). Full lines represent best linear fit for whole sample. Dashed lines represent best linear fit for sample 
excluding South Africa and Mauritius in panel (a); for sample excluding Ghana, Mozambique, South Africa and 
Mauritius in panel (b); and for sample excluding Ghana, Mozambique and South Africa in panel (c). 
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